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The Center of Excellence SAFE – “Sustainable Architecture 
for Finance in Europe” – is a cooperation of the Center for 
Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt. It is 
funded by the LOEWE initiative of the State of Hessen 
(Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung wissenschaftlich-öko-
nomischer Exzellenz). SAFE brings together more than 40 
professors and just as many junior researchers who are all 
dedicated to conducting research in support of a sustainable 
financial architecture. The Center has two main pillars: 
excellent research on all important topics related to finance; 
and policy advice, including the dissemination of relevant 
research findings to European decision makers from the 
realms of politics, regulation and administration.
In order to promote a fruitful exchange with interested par-
ties from politics, academia, business and the media, SAFE 
issues a newsletter on a quarterly basis. This aims to provide 
an overview of the Center‘s ongoing research and policy ac-
tivities. The SAFE Newsletter succeeds the House of Finance 
Newsletter, which was published between 2009 and 2012. 
SAFE is based at Goethe University’s House of Finance how-
ever extends beyond by drawing on scholars from other 
parts of Goethe University as well as from fellow research 
institutions. The Center builds on the reputation of the 
House of Finance institutions, serving as an interdiscipli-
nary think tank on the issue of finance.
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Content
“Where are the economists?” asked a major German weekly news-
paper some weeks ago in one of its headlines. The author diagnosed 
a deep gulf between economists and politicians in Germany – in 
times when economic advice would seem to be of greatest impor-
tance. Without commenting on his findings in detail, I agree with 
the general view that a strict separation of academia from the 
political debate needs to be abolished. 
Europe’s  financial  markets  and  institutions  face  a  sweeping 
restructuring of their common regulatory rule book. It is probably 
the most serious reform in decades – and it aims for a renaissance 
of  a  financial  “Ordnungspolitik”.  Driven  by  the  dynamics  of  a   
financial crisis of unknown dimension, and assisted by increa-
singly  felt  global  imbalances,  a  backing  of  policy  options  by   
critical contributions from independent academic bodies is not   
only  required  for  good  policy  making,  but  also  for  winning   
legitimacy for policy choices in the public eye. 
The criteria for academic policy advice – independent, research-
based, reachable – underlie the design of SAFE. Its Policy Center 
is SAFE’s second main pillar – alongside the research program. 
The Policy Center caters to the needs of policy makers in Europe – 
providing background research, personal advice and professional 
staff development with an eye on practicality (common sense) 
and understandability. 
In August, SAFE offered its first executive training seminar for policy 
makers, under its Summer Academy program, focusing on finan-
cial market regulation and its implications. Prominent speakers 
from the European Central Bank, the Bank for International Settle-
ments, the International Monetary Fund as well as from academia 
pre  sented a fact- and evidence-based assessment of the impact 
of recently implemented reforms on financial markets and their 
stability. The  interest  the  SAFE  Summer  Academy  met  among 
institutions like the European Parliament, the Bundestag and the 
German Ministry of Finance speaks for itself (see also pp. 10-11).
Other activities of the SAFE Policy Center include small off-the- 
record policy workshops with high-ranking representatives from 
governments and parliaments in Wiesbaden, Berlin and Brussels 
and a breakfast talk series as well as a lecture series on topical 
regulation issues for a general public. The publications of the Policy 
Center are freely available on the SAFE website, and can be searched 
by author or keyword.
Looking back at the initially raised question, SAFE will stimulate 
research-backed policy debate, and is willing  to do its part  to 
facilitate better policy making. 
Yours sincerely,
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen 
Director 
Center of Excellence SAFE
Editorial4
We address the general question whether 
and  to  what  extent  trading  motives  of   
individual  investors  affect  their  trading 
behavior  and  their  propensity  to  make 
trading mistakes. Specifically, we examine 
two major motives for selling securities 
from one’s portfolio, namely liquidity needs 
and speculative intentions.
Using  a  unique  dataset  on  individual  investors’ 
daily security and cash holdings, we first catego-
rize all observed security sales into one out of three 
categories: sales that are motivated by liquidity 
needs, sales that are driven by speculation, and all 
other sales transactions with unspecified motives. 
We then compare investor behavior across these 
three categories and demonstrate systematic dif-
ferences in trading behavior. When trading to sat-
isfy liquidity needs, investors rely more on heuris-
tics such as selling lower-cost mutual funds, selling 
more winners and fewer losers, and selling atten-
tion-grabbing stocks. When trading speculatively, 
they tend to make less use of heuristics.
Our findings are relevant in the light of recent re-
search output which has shown that individual 
investors  lose  a  substantial  amount  of  money 
from poor trading decisions (e.g. Barber et al., 
2009). Better insights into what drives these de-
cisions are a precondition to help investors to en-
hance their decision quality.
Hypotheses and Research Design
We conjecture that investors who face liquidity 
needs are time pressured and as a consequence 
will seek to simplify their decision making and 
rely  more  on  heuristics.  We  therefore  expect  
liquidity-driven selling decisions to be more bi-
ased than other trades. For speculative security 
sales the reverse should hold true as speculative 
intentions are unlikely to be correlated with ex-
ternal constraints. Speculative sales would then 
be more strongly driven by controlled reasoning, 
relatively  less  biased  and  therefore  of  better 
quality.
To categorize sales based on trade motives we 
track how investors use the cash proceeds from 
the sale. We have daily transaction data on all   
security and cash accounts of over 5,000 custom-
ers of a German bank for the years 1999-2009. 
The data allows us to define a sale transaction as 
speculative  if  its  proceeds  are  reinvested  into 
other securities within a short period of time and 
to define a sell transaction as liquidity driven, if 
the  proceeds  leave  the  bank  within  the  same 
short period of time. About 20% of the 70,514 sale 
transactions  in  our  sample  are  categorized  as 
speculative, whereas about 12% are categorized 
as liquidity driven. The remaining 68% transac-
tions have no assigned trade motive and are used 
as reference group.
We measure decision quality in liquidity-driven 
and speculative sales as compared to the refer-
ence  group  along  three  dimensions:  incurring 
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higher-than-necessary trading costs, propensity 
to sell winners rather than losers (“disposition   
effect”), and tendency to sell attention-grabbing 
securities.
First,  we  analyze  the  role  of  security-specific 
transaction costs in selling decisions. Ideally, unin-
formed individual investors should sell securities 
with lower transaction costs to realize the best 
net return and have the lowest repurchase cost if 
liquidity needs are transitory. We find that inves-
tors only minimize transaction costs in liquidity-
driven sales of mutual funds but not in liquidity-
driven sales of stocks or in any speculative sale. A 
possible explanation for this difference between 
funds and stocks is that fund loads are much easi-
er to observe than bid-ask spreads of stocks.
Second, we investigate the role of trade motives 
for the prevalence of the disposition effect (i.e. 
sell winners too early and hold losers for too long). 
If liquidity-driven sales are placed under time con-
straints, investors might be more prone to this be -
havior than under normal circumstances. We use 
hazard models to analyze selling decisions and we 
estimate separate models for the decision to sell 
stocks and funds, controlling for tax-motives, in-
vestment experience and limit orders. The models 
reveal that the disposition effect is substantially 
higher  in  the  presence  of  liquidity  needs  and 
much lower for speculative sales.
Third, we analyze whether investors use general 
attention on some of their own stocks as a heu-
ristic guideline for their selling decisions. Using 
Google search volume data, we demonstrate that 
selling decisions are on average prone to atten-
tion bias. Liquidity-driven sales are about as at-
tention-driven as other sales but speculative sales 
appear to be less attention driven. Together with 
the  finding  that  investors  buy  attention-grab-
bing stocks (Barber and Odean, 2008), specula-
tive investors thus appear to be exchanging less 
popular for more popular “hot” stocks.
Finally, we measure the performance effects of 
liquidity-driven and speculative trading on port-
folio returns. For each sale, we estimate portfolio 
alphas  (i.e.,  abnormal  returns)  directly  before 
and after the sale using different horizons and 
performance-adjustment  models.  Comparing 
these  alphas  while  controlling  for  transaction 
size and mechanical effects of a sale on idiosyn-
cratic  volatility  we  show  that  liquidity-driven 
sales of mutual funds have a negative perfor-
mance  contribution  while  speculative  sales 
make  a  positive  contribution.  The  results  for 
stocks are less clear-cut and depend on the per-
formance metric.
Contributions and Implications
The  paper  adds  new  evidence  that  individual  
investor trading is systematically biased and that 
biases depend on the individual trading context 
(Coates, Gurnell and Sarnyai, 2010). Liquidity-driv-
en sales appear more biased and speculative sales 
appear to be more rationally motivated. Trade mo-
tives therefore not only matter for professional in-
vestors (Alexander, Cici and Gibson, 2007) but also 
for their retail counterparts. We also contribute to 
the economics literature in the spirit of Baumol 
(1952) on how households manage their cash hold-
ings. This literature usually describes cash holdings 
as dependent on the interest rate and transaction 
costs. We extend the analysis from cash to security 
holdings and thereby hope to inform future litera-
ture on household cash management in a multi-
asset setting. Finally, the paper has implications 
for financial market models. Most models assume 
that the majority of trades by individuals are li-
quidity driven and occur randomly. We can show 
that, in reality, only a small fraction of trades quali-
fies as liquidity-driven and that these trades are 
not random but show patterns. In times of corre-
lated liquidity shocks some securities will there-
fore experience higher selling pressure from indi-
vidual investors than others.
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There is by now an established acceptance 
that monetary policy should be comple-
mented  by  macroprudential  policy  and 
that expansionary policies entail trade-
offs.  While  they  help  boost  the  stock 
market and recover banks’ balance sheet 
values they may produce risk-taking over 
medium to long horizons. As policy rates 
are  kept  low  for  extended  periods  of   
time,  banks  tend  to  shift  their  liability  
from  subordinated  equities  towards   
short-term senior (but uninsured) assets 
(such as asset-backed securities), which  
are  a  cheaper  and  easier  form  of  bank  
financing:  ex  post  this  excessive  bank 
leverage  increases  the  probability  that 
uninformed  investors  holding  a  bank’s 
short-term  liabilities  will  then  run  the 
bank.
Prior  to  the  crisis,  the  monetary  transmission 
mechanism  had  neglected  entirely  the  pos-
sible adverse consequences of monetary policy 
on bank fragility: a reduction of the policy rate 
could boost aggregate demand in the presence 
of nominal rigidities and/or other liquidity chan-
nels; an expansion in liquidity could boost lend-
ing and foster asset price growth. But, effectively, 
no link was discussed between monetary policy 
actions and the endogenous formation of risk in 
either financial markets or the banking sector.
The authors present a model which does that. 
They  build  a  macro  model  with  optimizing 
banks  and  the  endogenous  formation  of  risk 
that stems from fundamental bank runs. Banks 
hold  both  bank  capital  and  short-term  liabili-
ties which can be served first and sequentially. 
When uninformed investors observe bad signals 
on bank asset returns, they coordinate and run 
the bank concerned. Bank asset values depend 
upon asset prices, which in turn result from fi-
nancial market equilibrium and are also affected 
by idiosyncratic shocks. As a result of these as-
sumptions,  the  model  features  both  a  bank   
balance sheet channel, through which swings in 
asset prices affect bank net worth, as well as a 
risk-taking channel, by which reductions in the 
risk-free rate render short-term financing more 
desirable compared to bank capital (effectively 
entailing  deviation  from  the  Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem). 
The Central Bank’s Trade-Off
Monetary  policy  therefore  faces  a  trade-off: 
on the one hand, a reduction of the policy rate   
facilitates lending and investment, and increa-
ses asset prices, which in turn boosts bank asset   
values (which are in fact valued at market prices). 
Through  this  channel,  expansionary  monetary 
policy can prevent large disruptions in the bank-
ing sector if an adverse financial shock hits as-
set prices or loan returns. On the other hand, a 
reduction in the policy rate triggers a reduction 
of  the  baseline  rate  for  short-term  liabilities: 
this induces the bank to shift funding from bank 
equity to short-term liabilities. By increasing the 
share of short-term debt, the bank increases the 
probability  that  a  run  will  occur,  namely  the 
probability that the bank will be unable to repay 
a large platform of uninsured liabilities if and 
when bank assets are hit by adverse shocks. The 
latter mechanism entails a risk-taking channel 
on the liability side (evidence of the importance 
of this channel in macro time series analysis is 
found in Angeloni, Faia and Lo Duca 2010).
The model is shown to reproduce the main busi-
ness cycle properties of both macro variables as 
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well as banking variables (it matches the procy-
clicality bank capital and the standard deviations 
and persistence of the main banking variables, in-
cluding bank riskiness). For this reason, the model 
is particularly well suited for policy analysis. 
Basel II is Most Destabilizing
Indeed, the authors use the model to analyze the 
optimal combination of monetary and macro-
prudential policy. The latter is modeled through 
a  sector  wide  time-varying  minimum  capital 
ratio. In the presence of a capital requirement, 
bank  optimization  delivers  an  actual  capital 
ratio  that  optimally  maintains  a  safety  buffer 
above the minimum. The bank capital require-
ment is introduced in three different formula-
tions: fixed (Basel I), procyclical (Basel II), coun-
tercyclical (Basel III). The authors find that the 
Basel  II  regulations  are  the  most  destabilizing 
(see Figure 1): while they may be optimal from 
the point of view of a single optimizing bank, 
they amplify business cycle fluctuations, as, by 
forcing banks to raise equity capital in recessions 
(and release equity capital in booms), they ex-
acerbate lending booms and busts. In contrast, 
the countercyclical bank capital buffers help to 
smooth the business cycle through the build-up 
of precautionary buffers.
The authors also find that the optimal combi-
nation (the one that maximizes agents’ utility) 
between monetary policy and prudential regu-
lation entails monetary policy rules that mildly 
respond  to  banks’  leverage  (and  aggressively 
respond  to  inflation)  and  countercyclical  bank 
capital ratios.
The  above  model  can  of  course  be  used  to  
analyze a number of questions related to the 
effects of policy on the endogenous formation 
of financial risk; an issue which is high on the 
agenda of both academics and policy makers.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions of a 1% productivity increase under alternative Basel regimes
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In the course of the financial crisis, cen-
tral banks of major currency areas have 
injected an unforeseen volume of money 
into  the  financial  system  by  “outright” 
purchases  of  financial  instruments  or 
by  generously  granting  credit  to  banks 
at  almost  no  costs.  In  order  to  justify 
such programs in the Eurosystem, it has   
become common practice to point at the 
operations  of  the  U.S.  Federal  Reserve   
System  (Fed)  and  the  Bank  of  England. 
These,  however,  are  much  more  limited 
in scope than assumed and on a substan-
tially different legal basis.
The downplaying designation “quantitative eas-
ing” has become famous since the vast purchase 
of debt instruments (at first: mortgage backed 
securities) by the Fed initiated in March 2009. 
Almost at the same time, the Bank of England in-
augurated a similar program by acquiring “high-
quality debt” issued by private institutions. The 
term  “quantitative  easing”  –  and  perhaps  the 
policy itself – was probably coined by the Bank 
of Japan as early as 2001 (Shirakawa, 2002). 
The  Eurosystem  started  a  relatively  moderate 
program to buy covered bonds in spring 2009. 
But eventually, in May 2010, the European Central 
Bank  (ECB)  implemented  a  number  of  “uncon-
ventional” measures to support ailing banks and 
credit-dependent  sovereigns  or  to  boost  eco-
nomic growth, mainly in the southern periphery 
of the eurozone. Step by step, it also changed 
fundamental  rules  for  its  operations,  e.g.  by 
substantially reducing the requirements for col-
lateral or by shattering the time frame for its 
operations from a few days to up to three years 
(LTRO).  In  September  2012,  the  ECB  even  an-
nounced potentially unlimited future Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT).
The Eurosystem
The  ECB  justified  its  broadly  criticized  programs 
by the exceptionally high risk premia embodied in 
government bond prices for some euro area mem-
ber countries which were allegedly hindering the 
transmission of monetary policy in that part of the 
monetary union. It considered risk premia as unac -
ceptable that are related to fears of the reversibility 
of the euro as the currency of these countries. 
In the judgment of the critics, the bond buying 
programs, especially the OMT, are a selective or 
even arbitrary subsidy of interest rates in favor 
of governments or banking systems in financial 
distress. In their view, safeguarding the present 
composition of the euro zone is not a task con-
ferred  on  the  ECB  (Siekmann,  2013;  Siekmann 
and  Wieland,  2013,  p.  3,  7).  Also,  the  Bundes-
bank could not find any evidence for a disturbed 
transmission  of  monetary  policy  that  would 
need to be counteracted by such interventions 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013).
In essence, the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) has assumed debt which could no longer 
be traded on the market, at least not at any rea-
sonable  rate.  At  the  time  of  purchase  it  could 
already have been foreseen that the operation 
might lead to a loss (Siekmann, 2013, pp. 140-142). 
However, operations that visibly embody a (po-
tential) loss for a central bank cannot be consid-
ered as monetary policy. 
Serious concerns exist that the OMT (and earlier 
the  SMP)  comply  with  the  general  prohibition 
of granting loans by the ECB or national central 
banks in favor of any type of government entity 
or  public  undertaking  (Article  123  paragraph  1 
TFEU). The readily used recourse to the language 
of Article 123 TFEU, which prohibits explicitly only 
the “direct” purchase of government debt instru-
ments, is too superficial. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court of Germany shut this backdoor on 12 
September 2012 in its decision on a temporary in -
junction “as it would circumvent the prohibition 
of monetary financing” (Bundesverfassungsge-
richt, 2 BvR 1390/12 etc., at no. 278). Its final deci-
sion is still due. 
Federal Reserve System
It  is  a  widely  spread  misconception  that  the 
“quantitative  easing”  employed  by  the  Fed  is 
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comparable to the – installed or announced – 
programs of the ESCB. The Fed does not buy or 
accept as collateral debt instruments issued by 
any state, its agencies, or municipalities, no mat-
ter whether directly or on the secondary market. 
It  does  not  even  provide  liquidity  assistance, 
not to speak of solvency support, or subsidy of 
allegedly too high interest rates for sub-central   
entities. In case of financial distress they have to 
help themselves. 
In essence, the Federal Reserve Act follows the 
real bill doctrine in designing the instruments 
granted to the Fed. This can be demonstrated by 
the regulation of the discount window (12 USC   
§ 343). It only allows to accept instruments with 
an underlying commercial transaction, similar to 
the former § 19 (1) no. 1 Bundesbank Act of 1957 
(“gute Handelswechsel”). Notes, drafts, or bills 
covering merely financial operations are explic-
itly excluded from discount. The same holds for 
financial  instruments  of  states,  municipalities, 
or their agencies. Only obligations of the Fede-
ral Government and its agencies are exempted 
from this prohibition. The Dodd-Frank-Act has 
somewhat relaxed these limitations in “unusual 
and exigent circumstance”, but only with strict 
safeguards. 
Even more important are the strict legal rules for 
open market operations. In essence, only bonds 
of the Federal Government and the agencies it 
has assumed liability for may be purchased, pro-
vided that they are bought “in the open market”. 
The purchase of obligations of any state, county, 
district, political subdivision, or municipality in 
the continental United States is only allowed if 
they are issued in anticipation of the collection 
of taxes or in anticipation of the receipt of as-
sured revenues, and only if they have maturities 
not exceeding six months from the date of pur-
chase (12 USC § 355 (1)). This is comparable to the 
limited power of the Bundesbank to grant short 
term  loans  to  public  entities  (“Kassenkredite”,   
§ 20 (1) no. 1 Bundesbank Act 1957). Even this very 
limited power had to be removed in establishing 
the European Monetary Union. 
Noteworthy is also the clause requiring a pur-
chase “only in the open market”. This has to be 
taken  literally.  It  requires  that  the  instrument 
had been bought before by an investor. For this 
simple reason, maneuvers like the ELA handling 
in  the  case  of  Ireland  and  Cyprus  would  have 
been illegal in the U.S. 
Bank of England
The situation in the UK is not comparable to the 
U.S. or the European Monetary Union. The Bank 
of England does not have to operate in a hetero-
geneous  area  of  a  federal  type  with  several 
states. Technically, it executes its purchases by a 
wholly-owned subsidiary, the “Bank of England 
Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited” (“the Com-
pany”). Although the purchases are financed by 
central bank money and could be used for mon-
etary policy purposes, the economic risk is not 
borne by the Bank of England. The Company is 
fully  indemnified  by  the  Treasury.  This  proce-
dure has to be judged as an attempt to comply 
with Article 123 TFEU, protocol no. 15, clause 10 
that provides an exemption only for the “‘ways 
and means’ facilities of the Bank of England”, 
which are also comparable to short term “Kas-
senkredite”. In effect, the Bank of England has 
not acquired sub-national assets and holds as 
assets from the public sector only UK govern-
ment bonds (“gilts”). Loans to local authorities 
are granted by the “United Kingdom Debt Man-
agement Office” and not by the Bank of England. 
Conclusion
Quantitative  easing  has  to  follow  strict  legal 
rules in Europe and the U.S. It is not generally 
accepted to purchase debt instruments issued 
by government entities below the central level. 
Namely the Fed is clearly restrained to obliga-
tions of the Federal Government and its agen-
cies. Also, the operations of the Bank of England 
are limited. The “unconventional” measures of 
the ESCB differ substantially from the quanti-
tative easing operations of other central banks. 
They cannot be judged as accepted instruments 
of monetary policy. 
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On  30  August,  the  first  SAFE  Summer 
Academy,  titled  “International  financial 
stability:  Thought  leadership  and  best 
practice in addressing European banking 
regulation”,  was  held  in  Berlin,  at  the  
representation  of  the  State  of  Hessen.   
Günter Beck, the academic director of the 
Summer Academy, welcomed the more 
than 30 participants from several Euro-
pean countries, representing many of the 
institutions  involved  in  the  legislation 
and implementation of financial markets 
regulation: the European Parliament, na-
tional  parliaments,  European  ministries 
of  finance,  the  European  Commission,  
the European Central Bank and national 
central banks.
The  SAFE  Summer  Academy  is  designed  as  a 
one-day training seminar for European policy-
makers dealing with financial markets regula-
tion. The topics covered in this year’s program 
ranged from a broader assessment of the charac-
teristics of an efficient and stable financial mar-
ket infrastructure to a particular focus on the 
recent and upcoming reform proposals of the 
European Commission, summarized under the 
term “banking union”. 
Peter  Praet,  member  of  the  Executive  Board 
of the European Central Bank, opened the day   
with a keynote-address on the role of the ECB in 
the handling of the financial crisis. Praet asked 
the question whether central banks have gained 
too much power as a result of the crisis. He ar-
gued that in the creation of the European Mon-
etary  Union,  a  strong  institutional  design  for 
monetary policy was a paramount objective. In 
his view, the ECB’s high credibility as an indepen-
dent institution was a strong force leading to its 
current important role in crisis resolution. Praet 
contended that the European Commission’s re-
form proposals for a single supervisory mecha-
nism and single resolution mechanism are also 
about making up for omissions in the creation of 
strong institutions in the area of financial policy.
In the first topical session of the day, on “Inter-
national Banking and Financial Markets”, Patrick 
McGuire, Senior Economist at the Monetary and 
Economics Department at the Bank for Interna-
tional  Settlements,  discussed  recent  academic 
insights and empirical evidence on how finan-
cial market regulations impact the activities of 
financial  intermediaries  and  capital  markets. 
He focused on answering the question of which 
measures improve the ability of financial mar-
kets to more efficiently channel funds to the real 
economy and thereby enhance financial stability. 
The discussion in this session showed that poli-
cymakers are concerned with the fact that inter-
bank credit in Europe is still contracting, showing 
the continuing lack of trust in the system. This 
observation,  combined  with  the  fact  that  the 
non-bank supply of credit is large and growing 
in many countries, leads policymakers to worry 
that  banking  regulation  is  shifting  operations 
into the non-bank sector and that unintended 
consequences of regulation are not sufficiently 
recognized. 
In the second session, Dirk Schoenmaker, Dean 
of the Duisenberg School of Finance, engaged 
participants in a discussion on “Open issues in fi-
nancial market stability and efficiency”. Schoen-
maker discussed the challenges the internatio-
nalization of the banking sector poses for (inter-) 
national  regulators  and  supervisory  agencies 
and what measures might be taken to deal with 
these  challenges. The  observed  re-nationaliza-
tion of banking markets begs the question, what 
the  future  of  international  banking  will  bring 
and whether the integrated banking model can 
persist. Schoenmaker argued that if cross-border 
banking is to remain an attractive business, then 
a strong supra-national regulatory framework is 
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necessary to guarantee the stability of financial 
markets and, for this, European member states 
must give up on national financial policies. 
The first afternoon session was led by Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia,  Head  of  the  Macro-Financial  Link-
ages Unit in the Research Department of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Dell’Ariccia delivered 
the rationale for the elements that must be part 
of a European banking union. He argued that the   
vicious circle between bank risk and sovereign 
risk can be weakened only by a common safety 
net for the financial system. Because of moral 
hazard  concerns,  a  common  safety  net  needs 
to  be  strengthened  by  a  common  supervisory 
framework. Lastly, because banking supervision 
is  only  effective  if  combined  with  resolution 
powers, a single supervisory mechanism must 
be enhanced by resolution powers. 
In the second afternoon session, open questions 
with respect to implementation of the banking 
union were looked into from a legal perspective. 
Tobias Tröger, Professor of Private Law, Trade and 
Business Law, Jurisprudence at Goethe-Univer-
sity Frankfurt, focused on issues resulting from 
the fact  that not all European member states 
are  part  of  the  Eurosystem  and  therefore  not 
automatically part of the common supervisory 
framework (SSM). While the European Commis-
sion has a proposal for member states to join 
the SSM on a voluntary basis, Tröger argued that 
the current institutional design for supervisory 
decision-making makes this unattractive. With 
no representation in the ultimate decision taken 
in the General Council, the “outs” will not want 
to  give  up  national  financial  policies.  Tröger 
views this as problematic, given that the issues 
with  cross-border  banking,  commonly  used  as 
justification for the banking union, do not stop 
at the borders of the Euro Area. He predicts that 
the implementation of the banking union will be 
an ongoing process and will, in the mediumterm, 
also require a treaty change.
The day closed with a panel discussion on the 
topic: “What kind of European banking union?” 
with John Berrigan, Director for Financial Stabil-
ity, Economic and Financial Affairs, in the Direc-
torate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
at the European Commission, Helmut Siekmann, 
Endowed Chair of Money, Currency and Central 
Bank  Law  at  Goethe-University  Frankfurt,  and 
Ashoka Mody, Charles and Marie Robertson Vis-
iting Professor in International Economic Policy 
at Prince-ton University. The panelists discussed 
controversially  the  question  of  whether  the 
theoretical design of a European banking union, 
including a common supervisory framework and 
a single bank resolution fund, with clear burden 
sharing  for  a  loss-absorbency  fiscal  back-stop, 
has the chance of practical implementation.
The consensus reached throughout the day, that 
the best insurance for financial stability is given 
by  an  independent,  best-practice  supra-national 
supervisor, was challenged by the view that the 
political consensus to subscribe to the necessary 
common resolution fund will not be reached in 
all member states. The panelists agreed that the 
next steps depend on the ability of governments 
to  convince  their  electorates  that  the  banking 
union is a net-positive for their nation. In this con-
text, the open question of how to deal with legacy 
assets in the banking system will be decisive. A 
clear answer as to how losses will be allocated is 
needed. Much hope is therefore placed in the ECB 
communication on  the up-coming asset quality 
review, that is expected in the early fall of this year.
Margit Vanberg
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Eleven New Assistant  
Professors Join SAFE Research 
Team
After a short but extensive search on the interna-
tional job market, the SAFE faculty has succeeded 
in winning 11 new assistant professors; each with 
an  impressive  international  background  that  will 
certainly  enrich  and  inspire  the  respective  SAFE   
research team:
•  Martin R. Goetz, formerly Financial Economist in 
the Risk and Policy Analysis Unit of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, will focus on regulation 
and the stability of financial institutions; he will 
be joined by Thomas Mosk from Tilburg Univer-
sity in the SAFE research area on financial institu-
tions.
•  Sascha  Baghestanian,  coming  from  Indiana   
University, Bloomington, will conduct work on 
microeconomics and experimental economics, 
and will be joined by Steffen Juranek, who is   
already based at Goethe University Frankfurt, in 
the SAFE research area on corporate governance.
•  Mariya Melnychuk, previously at the University 
of Alicante, Eirini Tatsi, from Goethe University, 
and Nathanael Vellekoop from Tilburg University 
will  all  strengthen  the  SAFE  research  area  on 
household finance. 
•  Giuliano Curatola, previously at the Swiss Finance 
Institute at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de 
Lausanne, will dedicate himself to asset pricing 
and trading, as will Satchit Sagade from the Hen-
ley Business School at the University of Reading.
•  Baptiste Massenot, previously a postdoctoral re-
searcher at the University of Lausanne will join 
the SAFE research area on macro finance, as will 
Alessandro Gioffré from the University of Basel.
New Endowed Visiting  
Professorship on Financial  
History
On the occasion of Goethe University’s centennial, 
Edmond de Rothschild Group and Metzler Bank in 
cooperation with the Institut für bankhistorische 
Forschung, Frankfurt, donate a visiting professor-
ship on “Financial History” to the House of Finance 
and the Center of Excellence SAFE. In the context of 
the visiting professorship, distinguished experts in 
banking and financial history from Germany and 
abroad will be invited to share their research out-
put and methods with researchers, students and 
the interested public in Frankfurt. The professor-
ship  –  the  first  of  its  kind  within  the  economics   
faculty of a German university – reflects increasing 
awareness of the need for interdisciplinary work in 
finance.
Brigitte Haar becomes a Mem-
ber of the Consumer Advisory 
Council of BaFin
Brigitte  Haar,  Professor  for  Pri-
vate  Law,  German,  European, 
and  International  Business  Law, 
Law and Finance, and Compara-
tive Law has been appointed to 
the  Consumer  Advisory  Council 
of  the  BaFin  (Federal  Financial 
Supervisory Authority) by the Federal Ministry of 
Finance for a term of five years and elected Vice 
Chairperson thereof. The Council is tasked with pro-
viding the BaFin with advice and insights from a con -
sumer perspective. It has 12 members, consisting of 
representatives from academia, consumer and in-
vestor protection organizations as well as ombuds-
men  of  extrajudicial  dispute  resolution  schemes 
and an employee of the Federal Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection.  
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SAFE Policy Discussion on Banking Supervision
On 16 July, Elke König, President of the BaFin, gave a lecture on the 
implementation of private liability in the resolution of financial insti-
tutions and the future role of banking supervision in Europe. In par-
ticular, she discussed how to implement new bail-in instruments in 
the process of a bank restructuring. In order to solve the prevailing 
“too complex to fail” problem, König demanded an internationally 
uniform resolution mechanism for banks. One key component of this 
mechanism should be the implementation of a broad bail-in which 
obliges both owners and creditors of banks to bear the costs of re-
structuring. In this context, the BaFin and the European Commission 
have argued against the use of a new type of contractual bail-in instrument in order to allow for more 
flexibility for banks, König said. Her lecture was part of the SAFE Policy Center discussion series on struc-
tural reforms in the European banking sector.
Positive Evaluation for Doctorate/Ph.D. Program in Law and  
Economics
The Doctorate/Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics of Money and Finance (LEMF) has received a positive   
interim evaluation for its further funding for two more years until 2014. This was decided by the Board of 
Trustees of Stiftung Geld und Währung, the foundation which has financed the program since its inception 
in 2009. Its decision was preceded by a positive evaluation of the program by some independent evaluators. 
These stressed the interdisciplinary approach, the study concept, the high scientific quality of the program, 
its institutional anchoring in the law school as well as the provision of “convincing and innovative” academic 
training. Also, the internationally outstanding researchers attracted as guest lecturers, who taught during the 
academic year or at the annual summer school and gave doctoral students an opportunity to discuss their 
research projects, were considered very valuable. According to the evaluators, the LEMF has “contributed sig-
nificantly to the German research landscape in law and economics”. The interdisciplinary program, directed by 
Brigitte Haar and Uwe Walz, currently includes 29 doctoral students with a first degree in law or economics. 
LEMF Summer School 2013
The LEMF Doctorate/Ph.D. Program had the pleasure of hosting its 5th Annual Summer School on Law and   
Economics of Banking from 12 to 16 August 2013. The internationally recognized experts on financial institu -
tions Gerard Hertig (Professor of Law, ETH Zurich) and Geoffrey Parsons Miller (Stuyvesant P. Comfort Profes-
sor of Law, New York University) presented a wide range of current issues from an economic as well as a legal 
perspective. Participants from all over the world gained valuable insights into the special role banks play in the 
economic system, their function as payment specialists and their ability to create liquidity. Furthermore, on the 
regulatory side, the lectures addressed the struggles supervisors and regulators are now facing, as well as de -
velopments in cross-border supervisory agencies, capital requirement rules and the implementation thereof.  13
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Research plays a vital role at the ECB and 
in central banks in general. Central banks 
draw  on  research  input  for  formulating 
their monetary policy strategy, designing 
their operational framework and commu-
nicating  their  policy  response  to  excep-
tional events such as the recent financial 
crisis. For instance, research can provide 
valuable  insights  into  the  dynamics  of 
the  economy  in  different  phases  of  the 
business  cycle,  and  particularly  in  times 
of  financial  turbulence.  Understanding 
how  the  functioning  of  specific  goods 
and  financial  market  segments  affects 
the transmission of monetary policy can 
help  policy  makers  devise  the  appropri-
ate  response.  Further  areas  of  research 
relevant for the ECB’s tasks and functions 
are monetary policy implementation and 
payments  systems,  as  well  as  interna-
tional and European cooperation. Intense 
research  efforts  are  currently  (and  will 
be for some time in the future) devoted 
to  the  interaction  between  the  macro-
economy and financial instabilities. Other 
important  areas  of  research  highlighted 
by the crisis include the identification of   
systemic risk, as well as measures to pre-
empt its build-up and contain its conse-
quences.  
Policy decisions benefit from model-based analy-
ses and up-to-date information on the state of 
the economy, and require sound judgement. Re-
search from the central banking research com-
munity and from academics is key to interpret 
and bring together this information in a coher-
ent framework. In the pursuit of its responsibili-
ties, the ECB is fostering an intense exchange of 
information,  discussion  and  cooperation  with 
the academic world at all levels. Research at the 
ECB  has  an  important  role  in  facilitating  this 
interaction.  It  contributes  to  the  ECB’s  mon-
etary policy and its other tasks and functions 
including via research-based policy advice and 
analytical  tools.  Besides  research  in  monetary 
economics,  macroeconomics  and  finance,  the 
ECB develops, maintains and uses theoretical as 
well as econometric models for forecasting and 
policy analyses. 
A number of research networks of the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) have been estab -
lished, focusing on a wide range of topics. Cur-
rently the following networks address questions 
and research topics that are of key relevance to 
the monetary policy and financial stability poli-
cies in particular in the light of the recent finan-
cial  crisis  and  the  subsequent  sovereign  debt 
crisis: The Macro-prudential Research Network 
(MaRs), the Household Finance and Consump-
tion Network (HFCN), the Competitiveness Re-
search Network (CompNet) and the Euro Area 
Business  Cycle  Network  (EABCN).  These  net-
works provide another platform for researchers 
from ESCB National Central Banks and the ECB 
to interact with academics as collaborators and 
consultants that is mutually beneficial. 
The  two-way  interaction  between  academia 
and the ECB is also ensured by a very active visi-
tor program. Leading experts in economics and 
finance  regularly  come  to  the  ECB  to  discuss 
their most recent findings at seminars, confer-
ences or workshops, often co-hosted with other 
major central banks and research institutions, as 
well as to provide consultancy. The result is that 
research at the ECB is making an increasing con-
tribution to the academic debate, and academic 
research enriches the ECB policy debate, as re-
cently illustrated by academic papers providing 
various perspectives on the role of forward guid-
ance for the way monetary policy is conducted. 
The members of the Governing Council and the 
Executive Board of the ECB play an active part 
themselves in this regular exchange of views be-
tween the theory and practice of monetary poli-
cy. I can only encourage this dialogue to continue, 
to the greater benefit of all parties involved.
Peter Praet
Member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB
Cooperation between the ECB and Academia15
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Events
October
Monday, 7th  EFL Jour Fixe 
5.00 pm  Improving Sensing Capabilities of a Firm by Measuring  
  Corporate Reputation 
  Speaker: Janek Benthaus, E-Finance Lab
Monday, 7th  CFS Workshop  
4.00 – 6.00 pm  Increasing the Impact of Risk Management on Senior  
  Management’s Decision-Making  
  Organization: Sebastian Fritz-Morgenthal, FIRM;  
  Thomas Kaiser, Goethe University and KPMG
Tuesday, 8th  ILF Conference  
7.00 pm  Compliance – Befragungstechnik und Befragungs- 
  psychologie 
  Speaker: Ole Mückenberger, Wirtschaftsstrafrechtliche  
  Vereinigung
Wednesday, 9th  ILF Conference: Frankfurter Börsenforum 
5.00 pm  Speaker: Andreas Cahn, Goethe University
Thursday, 10th  ILF Conference  
9.00 am   Organization: Andreas Cahn, Goethe University; Souza;  
  Hengeler Mueller
Thursday, 10th  ILF Lecture 
6.30 pm  Debt Funds 
  Speaker: Mathias Hanten, DLP Piper
Monday, 21st  CFS Lecture  
12.00 – 1.30 pm  Speaker: Martin Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for  
  Research on Collective Goods  
Monday, 21st –  Deutsche Bundesbank/SAFE Conference 
Tuesday, 22nd   Supervising Banks in Complex Financial Systems 
9.00 am – 6.00 pm
Wednesday, 23rd  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics – joint with SAFE 
2.15 – 3.45 pm  Speaker: Marianne Bertrand, University of Chicago Booth   
  School of Business
Thursday, 24th –  GBS Executive Forum 
Friday, 25th   Karel’s Club – The Future of Life Insurance
Tuesday, 29th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics – joint with SAFE 
2.15 – 3.45 pm  Speaker: Lutz Kilian, University of Michigan
Tuesday, 29th  Finance Seminar – joint with SAFE 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Andres Almazan, University of Texas
November
Monday, 4th   EFL Jour Fixe 
5.00 pm  Impact of Information Disclosure on Prices in Real-Time   
  Advertising 
  Speaker: Marc Heise, E-Finance Lab 
Thursday, 7th  SAFE Policy Center Lecture 
  Die Europäische Einlagensicherung aus Sicht der  
  Sparkassen- und Finanzgruppe 
  Speaker: Karl-Peter Schackmann-Fallis, Deutscher  
  Sparkassen- und Giroverband
Monday, 11th  Frankfurter Vorträge zum Versicherungswesen  
6.00 pm   Umsetzung und Prüfung des GDV-Verhaltenskodex aus  
  Sicht des Wirtschaftsprüfers  
  Speaker: Gunter Lescher, PricewaterhouseCoopers
Tuesday, 12th  CFS Lecture   
12.00 am – 1.30 pm  Sovereign Money  
  Speaker: Joseph Huber, Martin Luther University of  
  Halle-Wittenberg
Tuesday, 12th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics – joint with SAFE 
2.15 – 3.45 pm   Speaker: Jim Nason, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Wednesday, 13th  SME-Network Initiation Event 
5.30 pm  Erfolg ist machbar! Potenziale erkennen und nutzen  
  Organisation: GBS, Offensive Mittelstand Rhein-Main
Thursday, 14th  ILF Pari Passu Conference  
9.00 am   Speaker: Andreas Cahn, Goethe University; Patrick S.  
  Kenadjian, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP; Klaus-Albert  
  Bauer, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
Tuesday, 19th  Finance Seminar – joint with SAFE  
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Norman Schürhoff, University of Lausanne
Thursday, 21st  Corporate Finance Summit  
10.00 am  Speaker: Andreas Cahn, Goethe University & ILF
Thursday, 21st  GBS Broaden Your Horizon  
6.30 pm  Self-Control as a Key Strength for Successful Leadership 
  and how our Brain exerts Self-Control – Insights from 
  Recent Neuroscience Studies   
  Speaker: Karolien Notebaert, Goethe University
Friday, 22nd –  6. ECLE Symposion 
Saturday, 23rd   Speaker: Andreas Cahn, Goethe University & ILF;  
10.00 am  Klaus Lüderssen, Goethe University
Monday, 25th  CFS Lecture  
5.30 – 7.00 pm   Primat der Politik? Die Entstehung der Europäischen  
  Währungsunion (tbc)  
  Speaker: Andreas Rödder, University of Mainz
Tuesday, 26th  IMFS Conference on Monetary and Financial Stability 2013 
8.45 am – 6.00 pm  Economic and Legal Limits of Central Banking 
Tuesday, 26th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics – joint with SAFE  
2.15 – 3.45 pm  Why do Europeans steal so much more than Americans?  
  Speaker: Marek Kapicka, University of California Santa  
  Barbara
Tuesday, 26th  Finance Seminar – joint with SAFE 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Pascal St-Amour, University of Lausanne
Tuesday, 26th  ICIR Seminar on Insurance and Regulation 
6.00 pm  Speaker: Felix Hufeld, BaFin
December
Monday, 2nd  EFL Jour Fixe  
5.00 pm  Optimized Cloud Data Center Selection of QoS – 
  Aware Service Provision  
  Speaker: Ronny Haas, E-Finance Lab
Tuesday, 3rd  Finance Seminar – joint with SAFE 
4.15 – 5.30 pm  Speaker: Alan Brav, Duke University
Wednesday, 4th  CFS Colloquium 
5.30 – 7.00 pm  Is the Euro at Risk? 
  Speaker: Jean-Claude Trichet, Banque de France
Tuesday, 10th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics – joint with SAFE  
2.15 – 3.45 pm  Speaker: Vincenzo Quadrini, University of Southern  
  California – Marshall School of Business
Thursday, 19th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics – joint with SAFE 
2.15 – 3.45 pm  Speaker: Antoinette Schoar, Sloan School of Manage- 
  ment – Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.
CFS  Center for Financial Studies
EFL  E-Finance Lab
GBS   Goethe Business School
ICIR  International Center for Insurance Regulation
ILF  Institute for Law and Finance
IMFS  Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability Center of Excellence SAFE | Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
A Cooperation of the Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt